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“Reading is first and foremost non-reading.” 
That is to say, “non-reading is not just the 
absence of reading. It is a genuine activity”: 
“There is more than one way not to read, the 
most radical of which 
 
is not to open a book at all. For any given 
reader, however dedicated he [sic] might be, 
such total abstention necessarily holds true 
for virtually everything that has been pub-
lished, and thus in fact this constitutes our 
primary way of relating to books. We must 
not forget that even a prodigious reader 
never has access to more than an infinitesi-
mal fraction of the books that exist. 
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“Even in the case of the most passionate life-
long readers,” Pierre Bayard insists, “the act 
of picking up and opening a book masks the 
countergesture that occurs at the same time: 
the involuntary act of not picking up and not 
opening all the other books in the universe.” 
If reading is, indeed, “first and foremost” 
non-reading, and if it is true that non-reading 
is “a genuine activity,” is there not perhaps, by 
the same token, a yet more radical—a more 
uncanny—way not to read? What of that 
non-reading, namely, at work in any given act 
of reading? What of that incomprehension, 
provisional yet indispensable, that elliptical il-
legibility, in other words, operative in every 
word that is read? After what fashion, if any, 
may it in turn be given to be read? And what 
could possibly be read by way of it?
2. 
Reading is situated beyond comprehension 
or short of comprehension. . . . There is 
something dizzying about reading, or at 
least about the outset of reading, that resem-
bles the irrational impulse by which we try 
to open eyes that are already closed, open 
them to life; this impulse is connected to de-
sire, which is a leap, an infinite leap, just as 
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inspiration is a leap: I want to read what 
has nevertheless not been written. 
~Maurice Blanchot 
 
To read what was never written—that is phi-
losophy’s first word and its last. 
According to Giorgio Agamben, “the genu-
ine philosophical element in every work, 
whether it be a work of art, of science, or of 
thought, 
 
is its capacity for elaboration, which 
Ludwig Feuerbach defined as Ent-
wicklungsfähigkeit. It is precisely when 
one follows such a principle that the 
difference between what belongs to the 
author of a work and what is attributa-
ble to the interpreter becomes as es-
sential as it is difficult to grasp. 
 
Daniel Heller-Roazen has written a beautiful 
gloss of that passage. 
 
Between a work and its commentary, 
there is always an interval. It may con-
sist of a historical removal, the tem-
poral distance that separates a written 
thing from one that later seeks to ex-
plain it. But the interval need not be 
merely chronological in nature. Its pre-
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sence can also be detected in the 
blanker regions of a single page: the 
typographical spaces that divide a ma-
jor text from the lesser ones that, be-
neath or beside it, aim to clarify its ar-
gument. The border is, in any case, de-
cisive. It belongs to the essence of the 
commentary to come into being at the 
outermost edges of a work and to 
move in the areas that at once sur-
round and do not coincide with it. 
This fact follows from the nature of 
the form and can be easily ascertained. 
If an explanation were without relation 
to that which it aimed to explain, it 
would obviously be none at all; but if, 
by contrast, it were truly a part of that 
which it aimed to clarify, it would be 
equally impossible to distinguish it as 
such. A commentary always moves in 
the narrow regions that wind around 
the work upon which it bears, follow-
ing and tracing its contours, and no 
matter how distant or how close to its 
text it may seem, an exposition never 
seeks either to leap beyond it or to 
venture within it. As its classical name 
indicates with a clarity that leaves little 
room for comment, the commentum 
stays at every point ‘with’ that upon 
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which it comments. In the realm of 
texts, it is an eternal accompanist, a 
permanent resident of the shifting 
space of being ‘with’ (cum). It lives no-
where if not in company: were it ever 
forced to be, so to speak, without its 
‘with,’ it would not be at all. 
For the greater part of its history, 
philosophy has been a practice of 
commentary, and it has conceived its 
most brilliant inventions at the edges 
of the corpus it has continued to ac-
company. Late Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages are perhaps the most il-
lustrious cases, periods of the prolifera-
tion of glosses, expositions, and para-
phrases (to say nothing of annotated 
editions and indexes) of all kinds. It is 
a truism that the thinkers of these 
epochs regularly departed from the 
theses of the tradition and, more pre-
cisely, from those stated in littera by 
the one who was for them the Philoso-
pher par excellence. But such a claim 
means little as long as it leaves un-
specified the role played by the en-
counter with ‘tradition’ in such a set-
ting. The commentators of late Antiq-
uity, the falāsifa and filosofim of clas-
sical Arabic culture, and the doctors of 
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the Latin Middle Ages may well all 
have conjoined their inquiries, in dif-
fering ways, to those of the authorities 
of Antiquity. The fact remains: more 
than once, they received from the clas-
sics something other than what had 
been transmitted to them. It followed 
from the nature of their craft. Glossa-
tors and their kind are incessantly in 
search of the animating element in 
their textual objects that bears no 
name: the dimension in them that, 
remaining unsaid, demands in time to 
be exposed. Thinkers trained as read-
ers, the philosophers of the tradition 
were no exception. They knew how to 
find the secret source of incompletion 
sealed in every work of thought, and 
they knew, too, how to draw from it 
the matter of their art. 
Reading is an art, and non-reading a genuine 
activity, when reading passes wholly into 
non-reading and what was never written 
comes to light in what is read. 
§ “To come to light”: In “What is the Contempo-
rary?” Agamben cites an explanation for the 
darkness of the night sky derived from contempo-
rary astrophysics. “In the firmament that we ob-
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serve at night, the stars shine brightly, surround-
ed by a thick darkness. Since the number of gal-
axies and luminous bodies in the universe is al-
most infinite, the darkness that we see in the sky 
is something that, according to scientists, de-
mands an explanation”: “In an expanding uni-
verse, the most remote galaxies move away from 
us at a speed so great 
 
that their light is never able to reach us. 
What we perceive as the darkness of the 
heavens is this light that, though travel-
ing toward us, cannot reach us, since the 
galaxies from which the light originates 
move away from us at a velocity greater 
than the speed of light. 
 
What comes to light—here—other than the pa-
thos of light’s absence? What is marked by black 
font on a white page other than our implication 
in something that, perpetually approaching us, 




To read what was never written finds its corol-
lary and completion in the injunction to write 
what will never be read. 
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Notes 
Pg. 1: How to Read  “If we are interested in 
the ways in which a text may be trying to be-
come something other than what its author 
and even readers intend and expect, we need a 
metaphysics of reading, and also of the texts 
themselves.” Eileen A. Joy, “Like Two Autis-
tic Moonbeams Entering the Window of My 
Asylum: Chaucer’s Griselda and Lars von 
Trier’s Bess McNeill,” postmedieval 2.2 
(2011): 325 [316–328]. 
Pg. 1: Reading is first and foremost Pierre 
Bayard, How to Talk About Books You Haven’t 
Read, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2007), 6. 
Pg. 1: non-reading is not just Bayard, How to 
Talk About Books, 12. 
Pg. 1: There is more than one way Bayard, 
How to Talk About Books, 1. 
Pg. 2: Even in the case  Bayard, How to Talk 
About Books, 6. Author’s emphasis. 
Pg. 2: that incomprehension […] operative  
For the dizziness of that incomprehension, its 
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temporality, see The Time That Remains, 
where Agamben elaborates linguist Gustave 
Guillaume’s concept of “operational time”: 
“According to Guillaume, the human mind 
experiences time, but it does not possess the 
representation of it, and must, in representing 
it, 
 
take recourse to constructions of a spa-
tial order. It follows that grammar rep-
resents verbal time as an infinite line 
comprised of two segments, past and 




past                     present                future 
 
This representation, which Guillaume 
even calls a time-image, is inadequate 
precisely because it is too perfect. It 
presents time as though it were always 
already constructed, but does not show 
time in the act of being constructed in 
thought. In order to truly understand 
something, Guillaume says, consider-
ing it only in its constructed or achie-
ved state is not enough; you also have 
to represent the phases through which 
thought had to pass constructing it. 
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Every mental operation, however 
quick, has to be achieved in a certain 
time, which, while short, is no less re-
al. Guillame defines ‘operational time’ 
as the time the mind takes to realize a 
time-image. An astute study of linguis-
tic phenomena shows that languages 
do not organize their own verbal sys-
tems according to the previous linear 
schema (whose defect lies in its being 
too perfect), but rather by referring the 
constructed image back to the opera-
tional time in which it is constructed. 
In this way, Guillaume is able to com-
plicate the chronological representa-
tion of time by adding a projection in 
which the process of forming the time-
image is cast back onto the time image 
itself. In doing so, he comes up with a 
new representation of time, that of chron-
ogenetic time, which is no longer linear 
but three-dimensional. 
Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A 
Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. 
Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), 65-66. Author’s emphasis.
Pg. 2: Reading is situated beyond compre-
hension Maurice Blanchot, The Station Hill 
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Blanchot Reader, ed. George Quasha, trans. 
Lydia Davis, Paul Auster, and Robert Lam-
berdon (Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 1999), 
434.  
 
Pg. 2: There is something dizzying  Blanchot, 
The Blanchot Reader, 433. Author’s emphasis. 
 
Pg. 3: To read what was never written  Daniel 
Heller-Roazen, editor’s introduction, in 
Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Es-
says in Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 1 [1-23]: “Among the notes 
and sketches for Walter Benjamin’s last work, 
the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ 
 
we find the following statement: ‘His-
torical method is philological method, 
a method that has as its foundation the 
book of life. “To read what was never 
written,” is what Hofmannsthal calls it. 
The reader referred to here is the true 
historian.’ […] What does it mean to 
confront history as a reader, ‘to read 
what was never written’? And what is 
it that ‘was never written’ in the ‘book 
of life’? The question concerns the 
event that Benjamin throughout his 
works calls ‘redemption.’ 
 
12 THE COMMUNISM OF THOUGHT 
“It is in this moment”—what Heller-Roazen 
identifies as “a messianic moment of think-
ing”—“that the past is saved, not in being re-
turned to what once existed but, instead, pre-
cisely in being transformed into something 
that never was: in being read, in the words of 
Hofmannsthal, as what was never written.” 
See also, section 153 of Theodor Adorno’s 
Minima Moralia, “Finale”: 
The only philosophy which can be re-
sponsibly practised in face of despair is 
the attempt to contemplate all things 
as they would present themselves from 
the standpoint of redemption. Know-
ledge has no light but that shed on the 
world by redemption: all else is recon-
struction, mere technique. Perspectives 
must be fashioned that displace and es-
trange the world, reveal it to be, with 
its rifts and crevices, as indigent and 
distorted as it will appear one day in 
the messianic light. To gain such per-
spectives without velleity or violence, 
entirely from felt contact with its ob-
jects—this alone is the task of thought. 
It is the simplest of all things, because 
the situation calls imperatively for such 
knowledge, indeed because consum-
mate negativity, once squarely faced, 
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delineates the mirror-image of its op-
posite. But it is also the utterly impos-
sible thing, because it presupposes a 
standpoint removed, even though by a 
hair’s breadth, from the scope of exist-
ence, whereas we well know that any 
possible knowledge must not only be 
first wrested from what is, if it shall 
hold good, but is also marked, for this 
very reason, by the same distortion and 
indigence which it seeks to escape. 
The more passionately thought denies 
its conditionality for the sake of the 
unconditional, the more unconsciously, 
and so calamitously, it is delivered up 
to the world. Even its own impossibil-
ity it must at last comprehend for the 
sake of the possible. But beside the 
demand thus placed on thought, the 
question of the reality or unreality of 
redemption itself hardly matters. 
 
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflec-
tions from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jeph-
cott (London: Verso, 1974), 247. 
 
Pg. 3: philosophy’s first word and its last  Eric 
Dietrich, “There is No Progress in Philoso-
phy,” Essays in Philosophy 12.2 (2011): 329–
344. 
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Pg. 3: the genuine philosophical element  
Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All 
Things, trans. Luca D’Isanto and Kevin Attell 
(New York: Zone Books, 2009), 7-8. 
Pg. 3: Between a work and its commentary  
Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Ar-
cheology of a Sensation (New York: Zone 
Books, 2007), 79-80. 
Pg. 6: In the firmament that we observe at 
night Giorgio Agamben, What is an Appa-
ratus?: And Other Essays, trans. David Kishik 
and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 46. 
Pg. 7: comes to light—here Were that “light” 
to reach us, in other words, the page that 
staged its arrival would be blank. 
In our house, this enormous suburban 
house, a rented barracks overgrown 
with indestructible medieval ruins, 
there was proclaimed today, on a 
misty, icy winter morning, the follow-
ing call to arms: “Fellow Tenants, I 
possess five toy guns. They are hang-
ing in my closet, one on each hook. 
The first is mine, the rest are for any-
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one who wants them. Should there be 
more than four, the others will have to 
bring their own weapons and deposit 
them in my closet. For there will have 
to be unity; without unity we will not 
move forward. Incidentally, I only have 
guns which are entirely useless for any 
other purpose, the mechanism is ru-
ined, the wads are torn off, only the 
hammers still snap. Therefore, it will 
not be very difficult to procure more 
such weapons should they be needed. 
But fundamentally, I will be just as 
happy, in the beginning, with people 
who have no guns. Those of us who 
do, will, at the crucial moment, take 
the unarmed into our midst. This is a 
strategy which proved itself with the 
first American farmers against the In-
dians; why shouldn’t it prove itself here 
as well, since the conditions are, after 
all, similar. We can even forget about 
guns, then, for the duration, and even 
the five guns are not absolutely neces-
sary, and they will be used simply be-
cause they are already here. If the other 
four do not want to carry them, then 
they can forget about them. I alone 
will carry one, as the leader. But we 
shouldn’t have a leader, and so I, too, 
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will destroy my gun or lay it aside.” 
That was the first call to arms. In our 
house no one has the time or desire to 
read such calls, much less consider 
them. Soon the little papers were 
swimming along in the stream of dirt 
which originates in the attic, is nour-
ished by all the corridors and spills 
down the stairs to struggle there with 
the opposing stream that swells up-
wards from below. But a week later 
came a second call: “Fellow Tenants! 
So far no one has reported to me. I 
was, in so far as the necessity of earn-
ing my living allowed, constantly at 
home, and during the time of my ab-
sence, when the door to my room was 
always left open, a sheet of paper lay 
on my table on which anyone who so 
desired could enroll. No one has done 
so.” 
Nowhere is it stated what, if anything, is 
written on that sheet of paper. That no one 
has enrolled implies that no names have been 
added to it. But not a single word here indi-
cates that there is upon the page any writing 
at all. 
To note that omission allows us to place the 
blank it elides. “In its deepest intention,” 
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Agamben writes, “philosophy is a firm asser-
tion of potentiality, the construction of an ex-
perience of the possible as such. Not thought 
but the potential to think, not writing but the 
white sheet is what philosophy refuses at all 
costs to forget.”  
Franz Kafka, quoted in Theodor Adorno, 
Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Sherry We-
ber (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), 
258. Agamben, Potentialities, 249. 
 
Pg. 7: its corollary and completion Agamben, 
The Time That Remains, 67-68 (author’s em-
phasis): “In every representation we make of 
time and in every discourse by means of 
which we define and represent time, 
 
another time is implied that is not en-
tirely consumed by representation. It is 
as though man [sic throughout], inso-
far as he is a thinking and speaking be-
ing, produced an additional time with re-
gard to chronological time, a time that 
prevented him from perfectly coincid-
ing with the time out of which he 
could make images and representa-
tions. This ulterior time, nevertheless, 
in not another time, it is not a supple-
mentary time added on from outside to 
chronological time. Rather, it is some-
18 THE COMMUNISM OF THOUGHT 
thing like a time within time—not ul-
terior but interior—which only mea-
sures my disconnection with regard to 
it, my being out of synch and in non-
coincidence with regard to my repre-
sentation of time, but precisely because 
of this, allows for the possibility of my 
achieving and taking hold of it. We 
may now propose our first definition of 
messianic time: messianic time is the 
time that times takes to come to an end 
[…], it is operational time pressing 
within the chronological time, working 
and transforming it from within; it is 
the time we need to make time end: 
the time that is left us. 
“Whereas our representation of chronological 
time, as the time in which we are,” Agamben 
concludes, “separates us from ourselves and 
transforms us into impotent spectators of our-
selves—spectators who look at the time that 
flies without any time left, continually miss-
ing themselves—messianic time, an opera-
tional time in which we take hold of and 
achieve our representations of time, is the 
time that we ourselves are, and for this very 
reason, is the only real time, the only time we 
have.” 











To seek to know before we know is as absurd 
as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to 






There is a certain plausibility to Nietzsche’s 
observation as to “what every great philoso-
phy so far has been: namely, the personal 
confession of its author and a kind of involuntary 
and unconscious memoir.” If that holds of every 
great philosophy, does it also hold of all the 
lesser—that is to say, and in addition, of their 
authors, ‘lesser’ philosophers? Those who are 
no longer read, those who were perhaps never 
read—is lesser achievement in philosophy, as 
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in any other endeavor, any less involuntary, 
any less unconscious? And how could philo-
sophical writing of lesser achievement be read 
as anything other than memoir? Does Nie-
tzsche’s observation, in short, hold any less of 
lesser philosophers? Or does it not rather 
hold more? 
For fear of having already spoken of my-
self—if not elsewhere, certainly here—per-
haps I can yet provide some clarification, if 
what I have written turns out to be philoso-
phy. 
2. 
My work was written under the sign of 
François Laruelle—without my knowing it—
and it is countersigned by Gilles Deleuze. 
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “The nonphilosophical is perhaps clos-
er to the heart of philosophy than philosophy 
itself, and this means that philosophy cannot 
be content to be understood only philosophi-
cally or conceptually, but is addressed essen-
tially to nonphilosophers as well.” That sen-
tence has stayed with me since I first read it, 
serving subsequently to orient all of my work. 
The note appended to it refers to Laruelle. At 
that time, and until very recently, I could not 
have told you who Laruelle was. 
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The difference between Laruelle and I is the 
difference between non-philosophy and, as it 
were, nonphilosophy. “Laruelle suggests,” as 
Ray Brassier has glossed it, “that the ‘non’ in 
the expression ‘non-philosophy’ be under-
stood as akin to the ‘non’ in the expression 
‘non-Euclidean’ geometry: 
 
not as a negation or denial of philoso-
phy, but as suspending a specific struc-
ture (the philosophical equivalent of 
Euclid’s fifth axiom concerning paral-
lels) which Laruelle sees as constitutive 
of the traditional practice of philoso-
phy. New possibilities of thought be-
come available once that structure has 
been suspended and non-philosophy is 
an index of those philosophically un-
envisageable possibilities. 
 
And I agree, again in Brassier’s words, that 
“the point, as Laruelle tirelessly repeats, is not 
to abandon philosophy in favour of a thought 
of immanence, but to use immanence to think 
philosophy. It is the consequences of thinking 
philosophy immanently that are interesting, not 
thinking immanence philosophically.” And yet 
that leads us to very different places. 
For me, the ‘non’ in ‘nonphilosophical’ 
makes it an impossible terminus technicus: the 
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‘other’ of philosophy, it approaches a vanish-
ing point with respect to it. And that poses a 
central problem: Whereas Laruelle doubles 
down on rigor, I would like to see how far it 
can be given up. 
3. 
I only began to write very recently—it was 
only very recently that I became able to write. 
In college, for example, I found writing in-
creasingly impossible, because whenever I 
contemplated writing a paper I could never 
get over the fact that I’d be handing it in to a 
professor: What could I possibly have to tell 
him/her that he/she doesn’t already know? It was 
crippling. 
In retrospect the difficulty’s clear: I hadn’t 
yet found those for whom I could write. 
It was my best friend that saved me. She’s a 
high school history teacher, and she teaches a 
philosophy class when enough kids enroll. 
She—and her students—provided the model: 
a curious, intelligent general reader. Not a 
professor, not any kind of specialist—but 
most importantly, not a philosopher. Or not 
yet. 
I should know. I came to philosophy late. 
And perhaps have not yet arrived. 




In a posthumously published fragment, Kafka 
writes, 
 
I can swim just like the others. Only I 
have a better memory than the others. 
I have not forgotten the former inabil-
ity to swim [literally, ‘the former being-
able-not-to-swim,’ das einstige Nicht-schwi-
mmen-können]. But since I have not 
forgotten it, being able to swim is of 
no help to me; and so, after all, I can-
not swim. 
 
Perhaps all I have done in philosophy is para-
phrase Kafka: I can philosophize just like the 




Pg. 19: To seek to know before we know  
G.W.F. Hegel, quoted in Lee Braver, A 
Thing of This World: A History of Continental 
Anti-Realism (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 61. 
 
Pg. 19: what every great philosophy so far has 
been  Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and 
Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 
24 THE COMMUNISM OF THOUGHT 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Ran-
dom House, Inc., 1966), 13 (Part One, Sec. 
6). 
Pg. 19: their authors, ‘lesser’ philosophers  
Are ‘lesser’ philosophers, for that reason, less 
philosophers? 
Pg. 20: countersigned by Gilles Deleuze  A 
special issue of the journal Collapse (Vol. III) 
came out not long ago, entitled, “Unknown 
Deleuze.” The phrase is apt. 
Pg. 20: The nonphilosophical is perhaps clos-
er  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 41.  
Pg. 21: Laruelle suggests that the ‘non’ Ray 
Brassier, “Axiomatic Heresy: The non-
philosophy of François Laruelle,” Radical Phi-
losophy 121 (2003), 25 [24-35]. 
Pg. 21: the point, as Laruelle tirelessly repeats  
Brassier, “Axiomatic Heresy,” 33. 
Pg. 21: For me For me, rather classically. See, 
inter alia, the very first page of Derrida’s 
Margins of Philosophy: “Philosophy has always 
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insisted upon this: thinking its other. Its oth-
er: that which limits it, and from which it de-
rives its essence, its definition, its produc-
tion.” Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1982), x. 
 
Pg. 22: how far it can be given up  “A simpli-
fication is a kind of subtraction or condensa-
tion, not to an essence, but to a glimmer of 
understanding.” John Mullarkey, Post-
Continental Philosophy: An Outline (London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2006), 189. 
 
Pg. 22: It was my best friend that saved me  
All my work is dedicated to her. 
 
Pg. 23: I can swim just like the others  Franz 
Kafka, quoted in Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
Echolalias: On the Forgetting of Language 
(New York: Zone Books, 2005), 146. Heller-
Roazen comments, 146-147: “There is no 
doubt that achievement, in these terms, grows 
difficult to measure.” 
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§III: Immanence (ǐm’ə-nənce) n. 1.
A life …1 
Fichte, to the extent that he overcomes the aporias of 
subject and object in his later philosophical works, 
presents the transcendental fielda as a life, which 
does not depend on a Being and is not subjected to 
an Act—an absolute immediate consciousness whose 
very activity does not refer to a being, but is cease-
lessly grounded in a life. The transcendental field 
thus becomes a genuine plane of immanence, rein-
troducing Spinozism into the most elemental opera-
tion of philosophy.2 
1 Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” Two 
Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-
1995, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges 
and Mike Taormina (New York and Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2006), 384-389. 
2 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 386. Author’s 
emphasis. 
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a. “What is a transcendental field?”3 But first, 
before the first words of the article, and more 
fundamentally: Why pair “transcendental” 
with “field”? For Deleuze,4 as for Kant,5 the 
transcendental is not the transcendent. The 
transcendent is, in its Kantian acceptation, 
and as Werner Pluhar has phrased it, an 
“overreaching, [B] 671, (i.e.,) going beyond 
(surpassing) the boundary of (all) (possible) 
experience, [B] 352-3.”6 The transcendental 
then, by contrast, concerns experience insofar 
as it is constituted, demarcated, by its bound-
ary: the transcendental informs experienceaa as 
its immanent, constitutive limit. A productive 
constraint, a placing, the transcendental has 
the shape of a field.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 384. 
4 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. 
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish-
ing Company, Inc., 1996), A 296 / B 353. 
6 See index to Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1013. 
7 “If what is given with respect to the formation of 
any field is the strength of the forces involved in 
its production, then what is given is precisely the 
producing of that field, so that, once again, what is 
given determines the transcendental as the tran-
scendental of what is given. What is given but nev-
er available is, in every case, what cannot be apper-
ceptively reproduced because it exceeds this as its 
28 THE COMMUNISM OF THOUGHT 
aa. “It”—the transcendental field—“can be 
distinguished from experience, to the extent 
that it does not refer to any object nor belong 
to any subject (empirical representation). It is 
thus given as pure a-subjective stream of con-
sciousness, as pre-reflexive impersonal con-
sciousness, or as the qualitative duration of 
consciousness without a self.”8 This is where 
Deleuze and Kant part ways. If the transcen-
dental field defines the contours of experience 
and yet does not coincide with experience it-
self, that’s because the transcendental field 
does not refer to any object nor belong to any 
subject, but situates them, as “a milieu.”9 A 
milieu of subjects and objects, and their inter-
actions, the transcendental field is the matrix 
of experience. And experience, in its incipi-
ence, anterior to any subject or object, has the 
character of an “a-subjective,” “pre-reflexive 
impersonal consciousness,”aaa “the qualitative 
source. In this sense what is given is formless pro-
duction.” Iain Hamilton Grant, “Movements of 
the World: The Sources of Transcendental Phi-
losophy,” Analecta Hermeneutica 3 (2011): 16 [1–
17]. All emphasis is the author’s. 17: “The tran-
scendental,” in other words, “is the in itself form-
less form of all forms.” 
8 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 384. 
9 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 389. 
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duration of consciousness without a self.”	  
 
aaa. “But the relation of the transcendental 
field to consciousness is only conceptual.”10 
For “as long as consciousness traverses the 
transcendental field at an infinite speed eve-
rywhere diffused, consciousness can in no way 
be revealed.”11 Here Deleuze cites Bergson, 
from the first chapter of Matter and Memory: 
“as though we reflected back the light ema-
nating from surfaces, a light which is self-
propagating and does not need to be re-
vealed.”12 What is the function of “as 
though,” the beginning of the citation, here? 
Perhaps the beginning of the citation enter-
tains an intimate relation to its end: the “need 
not,” of “does not need to be revealed.” As 
though, hypothetically, a revelation had oc-
curred in this connection. As though there 
were any question, in this instance. Of its ne-
cessity. “In fact, consciousness expresses itself 
only by being reflected on a subject which re-
fers it to its objects. This is why the transcen-
dental field cannot be defined by the con-
sciousness which is nonetheless coextensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 384. 
11 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. 
12 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. See 399 
for the note and quotation. 
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with it, but which eludes revelation.”13, aaaa 
aaaa. “Without a consciousness”—without a 
(any) “revealed” consciousness, consciousness 
“at an infinite speed”—“the transcendental 
field could be defined as a pure plane of im-
manence, because it escapes all transcendence, 
both of the subject and of the object.”14 What 
is to be made of the phrase “plane of imma-
nence,” let alone a “pure” plane? “It is a mat-
ter,” as Deleuze writes in Spinoza: Practical 
Philosophy, “of one’s practical conception of 
the ‘plan.’”15 Plan d’immanence, for Deleuze, 
and in accordance with two distinct senses of 
the French plan, “is a plan of composition, 
not a plan of organization or development”16: 
“not in the sense of a mental design, a project, 
a program; it is a plan in the geometric sense: 
a section, an intersection, a diagram.”17 Could 
plan not also perhaps—and for that reason—
be understood here as a verb? “Plane of im-
manence” would then be understood accord-
13 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. 
14 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. 
15 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 
trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988), 129. 
16 Deleuze, Spinoza, 128. 
17 Deleuze, Spinoza, 122. 
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ing to the objective genitive, as what remains. 
There is perhaps no purer plane.aaaaa 
 
aaaaa. “Absolute immanence is in itself.”18 
Immanence comes from the Latin immanēre, 
to remain in. As for absolute: “The Latin verb 
solvo, from which the adjective ‘absolute’ is 
derived, can be analyzed as se-luo and indi-
cates the work of loosening, freeing (luo) that 
leads (or leads back) something to its own 
*se,” where “the reflexive *se (Greek he, Latin 
se, Sanskrit sva-) indicates what is proper (cf. 
the Latin suus) and exists autonomously.”19 
To pursue the citation: “Absolute immanence 
is in itself: it is not in anything, nor can it be 
attributed to something: it does not depend 
on an object or belong to a subject.”20 And 
yet, in what sense can immanence be said to 
be absolute? What’s the status of that affir-
mation? Immanence is absolute precisely to 
the extent that immanence, taken absolutely, 
provides the terms for a clarification of the 
nature of the transcendental: “Whenever im-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. 
19 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays 
in Philosophy, ed., trans., Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 116. 
20 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. Author’s 
emphasis. 
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manence is attributed to subject and object, 
which themselves fall outside the plane, the 
subject being taken as universal, and the ob-
ject as any object whatsoever, we witness a 
denaturing of the transcendental.”21 However, 
as transcendental, if immanence is immanent 
to itself alone, what is the character of that 
self-relation? In what respect is immanence 
immanent to itself? Perhaps, properly, in its 
very definition. “To define, as the term itself 
yields,” as Kant writes, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason,22 “is in fact intended to mean no 
more than to exhibit a thing’s comprehensive 
concept originally within its bounds.” And 
what might those bounds be, finally, compre-
hensively? Those of a life… (“ceaselessly 
grounded in a life.”23) “The transcendental 
field is defined by a plane of immanence, and 
the plane of immanence by a life.”24, aaaaaa 
aaaaaa. “We will say of pure immanence that 
it is A LIFE, and nothing more. It is not imma-
nent to life, but the immanence that is in 
21 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385. Empha-
sis author’s. 
22 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 727 / B 755. 
23 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 386. 
24 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 386. 
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nothing else is itself a life.”25 A life, precisely, 
is the articulation of immanence to itself. “A 
life,” for Deleuze, “is everywhere, in every 
moment which a living subject traverses and 
which is measured by the objects that have 
been experienced, an immanent life carrying 
along the events or singularities that are mer-
ely actualized in subjects and objects,” for the 
“singularities or the events which constitute a 
life coexist with the accidents of the life that 
corresponds to it, but they are not arranged 
and distributed in the same way.”26 A life, in 
its very articulation, in the arrangement or 
distribution it effects or is constituted by, 
does not belong to an individual but to indi-
viduation. The latter attains its determination 
by way of the indefinite: “The indefinite as 
such is not the mark of an empirical indeter-
mination, but a determination of immanence 
or a transcendental determinability.aaaaaaa The 
indefinite article is not the indetermination of 
the person 
without being the determination of the 
singular. The One (the ‘a,’ the ‘an’) is 
not the transcendent which can con-
25 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 385–386. 
26 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 387. Author’s 
emphasis. 
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tain even immanence, but the immanent 
contained in a transcendental field. ‘A’ or 
‘An’ (one) is always the index of a mul-
tiplicity: an event, a singularity, a 
life…27  
aaaaaaa. Individuation is the topic of what 
Deleuze calls, in the article’s opening paragraph, 
“transcendental empiricism.”28 “To convert Kant 
from transcendental idealism to transcenden-
tal empiricism,” as Steven Shaviro has noted, 
“and from a juridico-legislative project to a 
constructivist one, is to move from the possi-
ble 
to the virtual, and from merely formal 
conditions of possibility [and of possi-
ble experience] to concrete conditions 
of actualization [that is, to the condi-
tions of real experience]. Deleuze’s trans-
formation of Kant thus leads directly to his 
famous distinction between the virtual 
and the possible.29  
27 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 388. 
28 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 384. 
29 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, White-
head, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2009), 34. 
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“The possible is opposed to the real,” Deleuze 
writes in Difference and Repetition.30 “By con-
trast, the virtual is not opposed to the real”31: 
“The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtu-
al.”32 The possible undergoes a process of 
“‘realisation,’”33 in other words, whereas the 
virtual undergoes a process of actualization. 
But caution is necessary: “It would be wrong 
to see only a verbal dispute here: it is a ques-
tion of existence itself.”34 For “the rules of ac-
tualization are not those of resemblance and 
limitation,” as with realization, “but those of 
difference or divergence and of creation”35: 
“to the extent that the possible is open to ‘re-
alisation’, it is understood as 
 
an image of the real, while the real is sup-
posed to resemble the possible. That is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. 
Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 211. 
31 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 211. 
32 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 208. Author’s 
emphasis. 
33 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 211. 
34 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 211. 
35 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tom-
linson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991), 97. 
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why it is difficult to understand what 
existence adds to the concept when all 
it does is double like with like. Such is 
the defect of the possible: a defect 
which serves to condemn it as pro-
duced after the fact, as retroactively 
fabricated in the image of what resem-
bles it. The actualisation of the virtual, 
on the contrary, always takes place by 
difference, divergence or differencia-
tion. Actualisation breaks with resem-
blance as a process no less than it does 
with identity as a principle. Actual 
terms never resemble the singularities 
they incarnate. In this sense, actualisa-
tion or differenciation is always a 
genuine creation.36 
“‘Real without being actual, ideal without be-
ing abstract,’”37, aaaaaaaa the virtual precipitates 
the unforeseeable. In a word, and by way of 
its individuation, precisely: experience.
aaaaaaaa. The article’s final paragraph begins, 
indefinitely: “A life contains only virtuals.”38, 
aaaaaaaaa
36 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 212. 
37 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 208. 
38 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life…,” 388. 
 MICHAEL MUNRO 37 
	  
aaaaaaaaa. A life, yes. But before that, or 
alongside it, virtually, a text, a doctrine 
(“transcendental empiricism”), some writing, 
a few pages, and even—“the qualitative dura-
tion of consciousness without a self”—a read-
ing: that is to say, a commentary. Specifically, 
a philosophical text and a philosophical com-
mentary. Philosophy—some philosophy, a 
philosophy—is here an element of articula-
tion, as a life articulates immanence in its 
immanence to itself. So that when Deleuze 
writes of “the most elemental operation of 
philosophy,” perhaps that phrase can be con-
nected, in its virtuality, to what Alberto 
Toscano calls “the signal task of commen-
tary”39: 
 
to intensify the complexity of the text by 
selecting and modulating certain moments 
and perspectives within it, to reorient 
the reader by inflecting its topology, 
and, most importantly, to spur the la-
bour of new repetitions, new habita-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Alberto Toscano, “The Colored Thickness of a 
Problem,” preface to Eric Alliez, The Signature of 
the World, Or, What is Deleuze and Guattari’s Phi-
losophy? trans. Eliot Ross Albert and Alberto 
Toscano (New York and London: Continuum 
Publishing Group, 2004), xiv [ix–xxv]. 
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tions of the text giving rise to novel 
connections and redistributions of its 
singular points.40 
Philosophy finds its singularity, its “specifici-
ty,” according to Toscano, “as a kind of trans-
historical machine for counter-actualization”41: it 
concerns “not exactly what occurs, but some-
thing in that which occurs,”42 and the condi-
tions of the latter’s extraction. One “delimits 
the original, disengages from it an abstract 
line,”43 as one does a quotation. It is along 
these lines that philosophy finds its defini-
tion.44 As does a life, here. Pursuant to a cita-
tion. … 
40 Toscano, “The Colored Thickness,” xiv. 
41 Toscano, “The Colored Thickness,” xv. 
42 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constan-
tin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles 
Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 149. Author’s emphasis. 
43 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 150. 
44 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone 
Books, 1992), 180: “Immanence is the very vertigo 
of philosophy.” Or perhaps: Philosophy is the very 
vertigo of immanence. 







§IV: ON THE COMMUNISM OF 
THOUGHT: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
BRIEF, BEAUTIFUL CORRESPOND-




Note: The five letters that comprise the corre-
spondence between Gilles Deleuze and Dionys 
Mascolo were written between 23 April and 6 
October 1988, and were first published a decade 
later, in 1998, a year after Mascolo’s death and 
nearly three years after Deleuze’s. They have 
been republished in Deleuze’s Two Regimes of 
Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995.45  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Gilles Deleuze, “Correspondence with Dionys 
Mascolo,” Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and In-
terviews, 1975-1995, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. 
Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York 
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First letter: Deleuze to Mascolo, 23 April 1988 
The occasion of Deleuze’s letter, the first let-
ter of what will become the correspondence, 
is Mascolo’s gift to Deleuze of his recently 
published book, Autour d’un effort de mé-
moire.46 Deleuze thanks him for it and men-
tions that since he read Mascolo’s Le Com-
munisme—first published 35 years prior, in 
1953—he has thought him “one of the au-
thors who has renewed most intensely the re-
lationship between thought and life.”47 Mas-
colo is “able,” according to Deleuze, “to de-
fine limit-situations by their internal reper-
cussions.”48 As an example Deleuze cites one 
of Mascolo’s sentences, “such an upheaval of 
general sensibility can only lead to new dispo-
sitions of thinking…,” and comments that it 
“seems to contain a kind of secret in its puri-
ty.”49 He closes the brief, elegant letter, “Let 
me express my admiration, and, if you accept 
it, my friendship.”50 
and Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 327–332. 
All emphasis is the author’s; sic throughout. 
46 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
47 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
48 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
49 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
50 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
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Second letter: Mascolo to Deleuze, 30 April 1988 
 
A week later Mascolo sends Deleuze a very 
beautiful response. “Your letter arrived yes-
terday”—first sentence, first paragraph.51 The 
second paragraph begins: “Beyond the praise 
it contained, of which I cannot believe myself 
worthy, and not wishing merely to thank you 
for the generosity you displayed, 
 
I must tell you how much your words 
touched me. A truly happy moment, as 
well as a wonderful surprise, to see 
oneself not only approved, taken at 
one’s word, but in a way found out or, 
precisely, surprised. This occurred in 
regards to the sentence you quoted 
(the one concerning the ‘upheaval of 
general sensibility’) a sentence that, 
you say, may hold a secret. This led me 
(of course!) to ask myself: What could 
this secret be? And I would like to tell 
you in a few words the response that 
came to me. 
It seems to me that this apparent se-
cret is none other (but then there is 
always the risk of wanting to pull it 
from the shadows) than the secret of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
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thought that is suspicious of thinking. 
Which is not without its own con-
cerns. A secret—if its concerns do not 
lead it to seek refuge in shame or af-
fected humor as sometimes happens—
that can always be justified in princi-
ple. A secret without secrets, or with-
out wanting secrets in any case. And 
such that if it is recognized (or is found 
again in another person), it is enough 
to serve as the basis for any possible 
friendship. I hope my hypothesis in re-
sponse to what I sensed was a question 
is not too reductive. 
I send you my regards, in a comrade-
rie of thought, and my thanks.52 
“[T]he secret of thought that is suspicious of 
thinking”: That is the “kind of secret,” “in its 
purity,” that Mascolo feels Deleuze refers to 
when quoting his sentence, “such an upheaval 
of general sensibility can only lead to new 
dispositions of thinking . . . .”53 But how is 
“thought”—and “thought,” moreover, “that is 
suspicious of thinking”—to be understood in 
relation to “general sensibility,” such that “an 
upheaval” in the latter “can only lead to new 
52 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
53 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327–328. 
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dispositions of thinking”? And what of its se-
cret? 
 (Then there’s the status of that secret. Mas-
colo calls it “apparent,” and notes in paren-
theses “the risk of wanting to pull it from the 
shadows.”54 What risk is courted here? Can it 
be known ahead of time, “apparent” though it 
is? And what’s the risk of upheaval, here, 
among the shadows?) 
 In the very next sentence, after Mascolo re-
veals what he believes the secret to be, “the 
secret of thought that is suspicious of think-
ing,” he immediately qualifies it, very mov-
ingly: “Which is not without its own con-
cerns.”55 What “concerns” are these, and what 
make them “its”—thought’s—“own,” con-
cerns that may “lead it to seek refuge in 
shame or affected humor as sometimes hap-
pens”?56 Are those concerns what guarantee 
that “a secret”—that secret—“can always be 
justified in principle”?57 “A secret without se-
crets, or without wanting secrets in any 
case”58—what’s the difference between these 
two phrases? Even if a secret does not want 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
55 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
56 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
57 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
58 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
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secrets, is it ever without secrets, secrets of its 
own concern, in any case, justified or not? 
How are the concerns of a secret to be 
squared with its desires? Can that be anything 
other than a secret? And how can it be “rec-
ognized,” let alone “found again in another 
person”?59 Even if it’s true that “it”—that rec-
ognition—“is enough to serve as the basis of 
any possible friendship,”60 what bearing does 
friendship have here with respect to upheavals 
in general sensibility, new dispositions of 
thinking, thought that’s suspicious of think-
ing, or its secret? 
 And all that on account of an offer of 
friendship? Over a secret, one that concerns a 
renewal, “intensely,” of “the relationship be-
tween thought and life”? 
Third letter: Deleuze to Mascolo, 6 August 1988 
A little over three months has passed since 
Mascolo’s letter and Deleuze begins with a 
recap. “I wrote to you, a few months ago al-
ready, 
because I admired Autour d’un effet de 
mémoire and because I sensed a ‘secret’ 
59 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
60 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
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rarely found in a text. Your answer was 
very kind and thoughtful: if there is a 
secret, it is the secret of a thought that 
is suspicious of thinking, thus a ‘con-
cern’ that, if found in another person, 
is the basis for friendship.61 
 
“And now I am writing to you again,” 
Deleuze continues, “not to bother you or ask 
for another answer, but rather [to continue]62 
a kind of muted, latent conversation that let-
ters do not interrupt, or even like an interior 
monologue about a book that continues to 
haunt me.”63 
 Then, abruptly (with the very next words—
no paragraph break, no warning): “Couldn’t 
we reverse the order? Friendship 
 
comes first for you. Obviously friend-
ship would not be a more or less favor-
able external circumstance, but, while 
remaining the most concrete, it would 
be an internal condition of thought as 
such. Not speaking with your friend or 
remembering him or her, etc., but on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
62 Brackets—and bracketed text—are editor’s or 
translator’s. 
63 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
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the contrary going through trials with 
that person like aphasia or amnesia 
that are necessary for any thinking. I 
no longer remember which German 
poet wrote of the twilight hour when 
one should be wary ‘even of a friend.’ 
One would go that far, to wariness of a 
friend, and all of that would, with 
friendship, put the ‘distress’ in thought 
in an essential way.64 
“Couldn’t we reverse the order?”—what’s the 
sense of that question, its function? “Friend-
ship comes first for you.” On the face of it 
that assertion seems simply wrong. Were not 
Mascolo’s very words that “the secret of 
thought that is suspicious of thinking,” when 
“recognized,” when “found again in another 
person,” “is enough to serve as the basis for 
any possible friendship”?65 And what’s more, 
did not Deleuze himself write as much when 
recounting Mascolo’s reply? How is one to 
make sense of that question and its attendant 
assertion? 
The sense of Deleuze’s words begins to be-
come apparent subsequently, with what fol-
lows: they seem to take on the character of a 
64 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
65 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
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suggestion, a friendly correction. They also 
seem to clarify a previous remark, one found 
in Deleuze’s first letter: It’s not immediately 
clear what Deleuze means when he states 
there, in the opening letter of the correspond-
ence, that Mascolo is “able to define limit-
situations by their internal repercussions.”66 
He had just written, in the sentence prior, 
that Mascolo is “one of the authors who has 
renewed most intensely the relationship be-
tween thought and life.”67 He now writes, as 
if by way of clarification, of the “internal con-
dition[s] of thought as such,”68 and specifical-
ly of friendship as one such “internal condi-
tion,” an “internal repercussion” of “limit-situ-
ations” “in the relationship between thought and 
life”69: “I think there are many ways, in the au-
thors I admire, to introduce concrete catego-
ries and situations as the condition of pure 
thought.”70 Deleuze then lists the fiancée and 
engagement for Kierkegaard; for Klossowski, 
“(and maybe Sartre in a different way),” the 
couple; and for Mascolo and Blanchot, friend-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
67 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
68 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
69 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327 and 329. 
70 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
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ship.71 “This implies a complete reevaluation of 
‘philosophy,’ since you are the only ones 
to take the word philos literally. Not 
that you go back to Plato. The Platon-
ic sense of the word is already extreme-
ly complex and has never been fully 
explained. Yet one can easily sense that 
your meaning is altogether different. 
Philos may have been displaced from 
Athens to Jerusalem, but it was also 
enhanced during the Resistance, from 
the network,72 which are affects of tho-
ught no less than historical and politi-
cal situations. There is a sizable history 
of Philos in philosophy of which you 
71 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
72 “Marguerite Duras’s apartment”—where Masco-
lo lived at the time—“became during the Occupa-
tion a rendezvous for resistants, Communists and 
writers like Edgar Morin, Alio Vittorini and his 
wife Ginetta, Claude Roy, Georges Bataille, Mau-
rice Blanchot and many others. It was typical of 
their cool-headed humanist conviction that they 
thought of themselves, not as ‘comrades’ (with all 
its nationalistic and militaristic connotations) but 
simply as ‘friends.’” James Kirkup, “Obituary: Di-
onys Mascolo,” The Independent, August 29, 1997: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obitu
ary-dionys-mascolo-1247789.html. 
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are already a part or, through all sorts 
of bifurcations, the modern representa-
tive.73 
 
“These are my reasons for returning to your 
text”—“at the heart of philosophy, in the con-
crete presupposition (where personal history 
and singular thinking combine)”74—“and to 
reiterate my admiration.”75 
 
Fourth letter: Mascolo to Deleuze, 28 September 
1988 
 
Almost two months later Mascolo replies. “I 
found your letter and your book,” the first 
words read, “when I returned. Thank you.”76 
A new paragraph begins: “I am deeply tou-
ched 
 
by your consideration. Despite the confi-
dence I have in your judgment, it has left 
me, to be frank, somewhat embarrassed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329–330. 
74 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 330. This phrase 
appears in the sentence immediately preceding the 
one in which it is here interpolated. The context 
makes the reference clear. 
75 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 330. 
76 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 330. 
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I admit. My perhaps misguided shame 
would have prevented me from re-
sponding if you had not already given 
me a certain freedom in speaking of a 
monologue. 
What I was trying to say, in response 
to your first letter (your remarks led to 
this situation), was that if there were any 
wariness in a thought toward thinking it-
self, an emergence of confidence (which is 
too much, but at least the temptation 
to lower one’s guard) can only come 
with the sharing of thought. This shar-
ing of thought must also take place on 
the basis of the same distrust or a simi-
lar ‘distress’ to form a friendship. […] 
You suggest a reversal of the proposi-
tion, making friendship come first. 
Friendship would then put the ‘dis-
tress’ in thought. Once again due to 
distrust, but this time distrust of 
friends. But then where would this 
friendship come from? That is the 
mystery for me. And I cannot imagine 
what distrust (an occasional disagree-
ment, of course, on the contrary—and 
in an entirely different sense that excludes 
malevolence) is possible of a friend once he 
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or she has been accepted in friend-
ship.77 
 
What Mascolo writes here seems clear. What 
he writes here is largely what he wrote before: 
friendship is consequent to an experience of 
the “distress” at issue:78 If there were any 
“wariness”79 or “suspicion”80 of thought with 
respect to thinking, when it is “recognized,” 
when “it is found again in another person,” it 
can serve as an occasion for friendship—“it is 
enough,” even, “to serve as the basis for any 
possible friendship.”81 
 So Mascolo resists the “reversal”82 Deleuze 
proposes: friendship, emphatically, does not 
come first for Mascolo. “You suggest a rever-
sal of the proposition, making friendship come 
first. Friendship would then put the ‘distress’ in 
thought. Once again due to distrust”—not 
thought’s distrust of thinking, as before—“but 
this time distrust of friends. But then where 
would this friendship come from? That is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 330–331. 
78 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
79 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329, 330. 
80 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328, 330. 
81 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 328. 
82 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
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mystery for me.”83 
And that’s also the crux of it: Mascolo 
writes from the standpoint of friendship, De-
leuze, from the standpoint of philosophy: Masco-
lo stresses the consequences of thought’s “distress” 
for life, while Deleuze stresses its consequenc-
es for thought. Deleuze first wrote to Masco-
lo as to “one of the authors who has renewed most 
intensely the relationship between thought and 
life.”84 Each writes from within that relation-
ship, but each writes from the opposite van-
tage: Mascolo emphasizes the genesis of 
friendship and what the “distress” that forms 
its basis means for life, “an emergence of con-
fidence”85 (even if that’s “too much,” and ra-
ther “at least the temptation to lower one’s 
guard”),86 while Deleuze insists on the neces-
sity of trials, “trials with that person,” the 
friend, trials “like aphasia or amnesia,” ones 
“that are necessary for any thinking” as “in-
ternal condition[s] of thought as such.”87 The 
emphases may differ but the “concerns” do 
not. And that’s the secret, the renewal effect-
83 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 331. 
84 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 327. 
85 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 331. 
86 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 331. Mascolo 
placed this qualification in parentheses. 
87 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 329. 
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ed here: the correspondence between Mascolo 
and Deleuze shows “the sharing of thought”88 
as it is shared out between friends. Mascolo 
writes, “I have called this communism of 
thought in the past. And I placed it 
 
under the auspices of Hölderlin, who 
may have only fled thought because he 
was unable to live it: ‘The life of the 
spirit between friends, the thoughts 
that form in the exchange of words, by 
writing or in person, are necessary to 
those who seek. Without that, we are 
by our own hands outside thought.’89 
 
“To you,” Mascolo closes, “with complete and 
grateful friendship. Forgive the elementary 
aspects of this response.”90 
Then, daringly, in a kind of reversal or up-
heaval, Mascolo adds a postscript: “In the 
end, I should have limited myself to saying:  
 
but what if friendship was precisely the 
possibility of sharing thought, from and in 
a common distrust with regards to 
thought? And what if thought that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 331. 
89 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 331. 
90 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 331. 
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distrusted itself was the search for this 
sharing between friends? Something 
that is already happy no doubt seeks 
something else that can scarcely be 
named. Daring to say it would be an 
obscure will, the need to approach an 
innocence of thought.91 
“Of course I say this with a little laugh,” he 
concludes. “Your questions have pushed me 
to avow some half-thoughts—like when you 
come to take the acts accomplished in a 
dream as your own. Forgive me.”92 
Fifth letter: Deleuze to Mascolo, 6 October 1988 
“Dear Dionys Mascolo,93 
Thank you for your very rich letter. 
My question was: How can a friend, 
without losing his or her singularity, be 
inscribed as a condition of thought? 
Your response is very lovely. And it is a 
question of what we call and experi-
ence as philosophy. Asking more ques-
91 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 332. 
92 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 332. 
93 Deleuze, “Correspondence,” 332.
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tions would only hold you back, and 
you have already given me so much. 
With my respect and friendship. 
Gilles Deleuze 
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§V: THE MORE BEAUTIFUL
QUESTION94 
94 Steven Shaviro, “Preface: A Philosophical Fan-
tasy,” Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, 
and Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2009), ix [ix–xvi]: “This book originated out of a 
philosophical fantasy. I imagine a world in which 
Whitehead takes the place of Heidegger. 
Think of how important Heidegger has been 
for thinking and critical reflection over the past 
sixty years. What if Whitehead, instead of 
Heidegger, had set the agenda for postmodern 
thought? What would philosophy be like to-
day? What different questions might we be 
asking? What different perspectives might we 
be viewing the world from? 
 The parallels between Heidegger and Whitehead 
are striking. Being and Time was published in 
1927, Process and Reality in 1929. Two enor-
mous philosophy books, almost exact contem-
poraries. Both books respond magisterially to 
the situation (I’d rather not say the crisis) of 
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modernity, the immensity of scientific and 
technological change, the dissolution of old 
certainties, the increasingly fast pace of life, the 
massive reorganizations that followed the hor-
rors of World War I. Both books take for 
granted the inexistence of foundations, not 
even fixating on them as missing, but simply 
going on without concern over their absence. 
Both books are antiessentialist and antipositiv-
ist, both of them are actively engaged in work-
ing out new ways to think, new ways to do 
philosophy, new ways to exercise the faculty of 
wonder. 
And yet how different these two books are: 
in concepts, in method, in affect, and in spirit. 
I’d like to go through a series of philosophical 
questions and make a series of (admittedly 
tendentious) comparisons, in order to spell out 
these differences as clearly as possible. 
 
Shaviro goes on to compare Whitehead and 
Heidegger on eight points, eight “questions”: the 
question of beginnings, that of the history of phi-
losophy, of metaphysics, of language, of style, 
technology, representation, and subjectivity. And 
yet there’s no question of the question itself—not 
as it’s at work in Heidegger and Whitehead. It’s 
admittedly a very minor point, if not tendentious 
as well. So much so, in fact, this is offered in jest. 
Itself something of a fantasy. And one, it’s hoped, 
no less philosophical. 
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You are so young, so much before all begin-
ning, and I would like to beg you, dear Sir, 
as well as I can, to have patience with eve-
rything unresolved in your heart and to try 
to love the questions themselves as if they 
were locked rooms or books written in a very 
foreign language. Don’t search for the an-
swers, which could not be given to you now, 
because you would not be able to live them. 
And the point is, to live everything. Live 
the questions now. Perhaps then, someday 
far in the future, you will gradually, with-
out even noticing it, live your way into the 
answer. 
~Rilke 
Always the beautiful answer who asks a 
more beautiful question 
~E.E. Cummings 
1. 
What is a question? A question, it will quick-
ly be surmised, that already precipitates so 
many others—perhaps principally: What is its 
nature, its status? What’s posed in a question, 
or by it?
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2. 
Early in the “Introduction” to Being and 
Time, “The Exposition of the Question of the 
Meaning of Being,” in the second section of 
its first half, more specifically, Heidegger 
“briefly” discusses “what belongs to a question 
in general.” In general, and immediately, it’s 
evident that what belongs to a question, for 
Heidegger, is a kind of activity: questioning. 
“Every questioning,” Heidegger begins his 
exposition, “is a seeking. Every seeking takes 
its direction beforehand from what is sought. 
Questioning,” in that sense, “is a knowing 
search,” and a “knowing search can become 
an ‘investigation,’ 
as the revealing determination of what 
the question aims at. As questioning 
about . . . questioning has what it asks 
about. All asking about . . . is in some 
way an inquiring of . . . . Besides what 
is asked, what is interrogated also be-
longs to questioning. What is ques-
tioned is to be defined and conceptual-
ized in the investigating, that is, the 
specifically theoretical, question. As 
what is really intended, what is to be 
ascertained lies in what is questioned; 
here questioning arrives at its goal. 
60 THE COMMUNISM OF THOUGHT 
Questioning arrives at its goal at the same 
time that the exposition arrives at a critical 
juncture: The next sentence reads, “As an at-
titude adopted by a being, the questioner, 
questioning has its own character of being.” A 
question, on Heidegger’s account, depends 
for “its own character of being” on the activity 
of questioning, and questioning, as an activi-
ty, relies in turn on the questioner who per-
forms it: in other words, according to Hei-
degger, what a question is—its “being”—dep-
ends on another being, the questioner, where 
it attains its determination, moreover, as a 
consequence of an “attitude” “adopted” by the 
latter. 
On that basis, and on the basis of the every-
day understanding of being everywhere in ev-
idence, Heidegger will claim a preeminence, a 
precedence, of the question of the meaning of 
being over all other questions, and, indeed, 
subordinates all other questions—all ques-
tioning—to it. But what of the question itself, 
as question? What about the “being” of the 
question before or beyond being, any question 
of being, or its meaning? 
3. 
What’s left of the question then, the question 
of the question? What does that question ar-
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ticulate, if anything, in that question alone? 
 That is perhaps, following Cummings, the 
“more beautiful” question (more beautiful 
than the question of (the meaning of) being). 
But what is the value of beauty here, and 
from whence does it come? More crucially—
and in partial answer—how is Cummings’ 
phrase to be read? Is “answer” a noun (where 
“beautiful” is an adjective)? Or is the subject 
of the (incomplete) phrase (there’s no period) 
“the beautiful” (where “answer” is a verb)? 
What is “the beautiful answer,” then? What 
makes an answer beautiful? What makes the 
beautiful answer, always? (“Always the beauti-
ful answer…”) And in what sense is there 





—the beauty we understand precisely       
because we do not yet understand it— 
~Adorno 
 
But first, and more fundamentally: What is 
beauty? Beauty is an event, as Whitehead 
says, and, as per Kant, it occurs between a 
subject and an object, a disinterested subject 
and an indifferent object: What’s beautiful is 
the disappearance of the two by way of the 
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coincidence they stage: The event of beauty is 
the formation of the perspective within which 
meet the indifference of the object to the sub-
ject and the disinterestedness of the subject 
with respect to it as a vanishing point. 
5. 
There are, then, successful ways of not 
knowing oneself, and beauty is one of them. 
~Agamben 
“The ways in which we do not know things 
are just as important (and perhaps even more 
important) as the ways in which we know 
them.” “It is possible, in fact,” Giorgio Agam-
ben continues, “that the way in which we are 
able to be ignorant is precisely what defines 
the rank of what we are able to know and that 
the articulation of a zone of nonknowledge is 
the condition—and at the same time the 
touchstone—of all our knowledge.” “The ar-
ticulation of a zone of nonknowledge”—
how’s that formula to be understood? How’s 
the task it proposes to be accomplished? 
Earlier, some twenty-five years before, 
Agamben ended one of his books with a fa-
ble, as if (already) by way of explanation. 
“The most diverse legends circulate about the 
inexplicable. The most ingenious—which was 
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found by the present guardians of the Temple 
while rifling through the ancient traditions—
claims that, being inexplicable, it remains so 
in all the explanations which have been given 
and that will continue to be given through the 
centuries. Indeed, precisely these explanations 
constitute the best guarantee of its inexplica-
bility”: “Our illustrious fathers—the patri-
archs—finding nothing to explain, searched 
their hearts 
 
for a way to express this mystery; but 
for the inexplicable, they found no 
more fitting expression than explana-
tion itself. The only way—they ar-
gued—to explain that there is nothing 
to explain is to give explanations. Any 
other stance, including silence, seizes 
on the inexplicable too clumsily: expla-
nations alone leave it intact. 
 
“Explanations are, in fact,” so the fable con-
cludes, “only a moment in the tradition of the 
inexplicable: they are the moment, to be more 
precise, 
 
which keeps watch over it by leaving it 
unexplained. Emptied of their content, 
explanations thus fulfill their task. But 
at the point where explanations, by 
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showing their emptiness, leave it be, 
the inexplicable itself is in jeopardy. 
Only the explanations were, in truth, 
inexplicable, and the legend was in-
vented to explain them. What was not 
to be explained is perfectly contained 
in what no longer explains anything. 
“What was not to be explained is perfectly 
contained in what no longer explains any-
thing”: It’s here, between explanation and the 
inexplicable—inexplicably, and yet without 
need of another word—that a zone of non-
knowledge is articulated: “Perhaps a zone of 
nonknowledge does not exist at all; per-
haps”—beautifully, vanishingly—“only its 
gestures exist.”
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which thus becomes the exemplary or 
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